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TITLES TO MARSHLANDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN MILES HORLBECK*
PART II
C. Navigability of Tidal Streams
By the common law, all water was navigable which was
subject to the flow of the tides.257 This rule was first modi-
fied when the navigability of large inland rivers in South
Carolina came before the courts. The history of the modi-
fication of the common law concept of navigability, as ap-
plied to both tidal and inland rivers, serves both to show
that the common law has been modified in South Carolina,
and also to contrast the modifications made necessary by the
actual navigability of large inland rivers, with the rules which
have been more and more strictly applied to all tidal waters,
even in the face of plain facts proving non-navigability. In
addition, the concepts and tests of navigability of tidal
streams are necessary ingredients in any appraisal of marsh-
land titles, because the simple rule of the Pacific Guano
case,258 that beds of tidal navigable streams are held in trust
by the state, has been extended to include marshlands by
the apparent ruling of the Cape Romaine case, that, because
marshlands are situated below high water mark, they con-
stitute tidal, "navigable streams." 259 Discussion of the more
recent cases is under headings of the factual situation in
which they arose, chronologically wherever possible.
To those familiar with history, it is not surprising that the
powers of the Federal Government over navigation have been
construed by federal courts to include all lands lying below
*B.A. 1947, Yale University; LL.B. 1950, University of Virginia;
Member S. C. House of Representatives, 1955-58; Member, Firm of Cornish
& Horlbeck, Attorneys, Charleston, S. C.
257. Gould, op. 'cit., Sec. 42, p. 103. The various state courts are in con-
flict on this matter, some having adopted the common law rule, while
others and the U. S. Admiralty Courts, have repudiated the common law
rule; but even *here repudiated, there is conflict as to whether the land-
owher holds to high or low water mark. T'FNY, REAL f1opmTY 454-455
(1940).
258. Supra, notes 201, 202.
259. Infra, notes 300-311 and text.
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mean high water mark of inland (fresh water) rivers as
well as of tidal rivers.
260
It is 'noteworthy that the South Carolina Court in a recent
case turned to federal decisions for a definition of the bed
of a navigable stream.261 Since the federal courts appear to
apply the same test for navigability of both tidal and non-
tidal waters, what has now become of the common law dis-
tinctions between the law as to fresh and salt water rivers
in South Carolina?
(1) Earlier cases re navigability in general
Navigability of rivers has often been compared with move-
ment on land highways. The South Carolina Supreme Court
has stated, "We shall refer to land roads as dirt highways
and to navigable rivers as water highways. ' 262 In the case
of Witter v. Harvey,263 Mr. Justice Nott, in comparing land
highways to river highways, stated that rivers not navigable
belong to the owners of the soil, but this principle is not
applicable to the large navigable rivers, and he recognized
the necessity of navigable and other streams as natural
boundaries. 2 4 Conversely, the fact that a tract of land was
260. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 33 S. Ct. 679,
57 L. Ed. 1082 (1913); United States v. Chicago, 312 U. S. 592, 61 S. Ct.
772, 85 L. Ed. 1064 (1941); Willink v. United States, 240 U. S. 572, 36
S. Ct. 422, 60 L. Ed. 800 (1916); Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269,
41 L. Ed. 996 (1897); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4, 24 L. Ed. 34
(1876). And see further, for example, Kilpatrick, "The Sovereign States"
Regnery Co., 1957) pages 287-291.
261. Early v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 228 S. C. 392,
405-406, 90 S. E. 2d 472, 478-479 (1955). Where the court recognized that
"the dominant power of the government in the interest of navigation"
"extends to the entire bed of the stream, i.e., to ordinary high water mark
on either side." For several cases dealing with the paramount rights in
oyster lands of the United States Government for navigation and com-
merce see Brown v. United States, 81 Fed. 55 (1897) and 100 Fed. 1006
(19005; Richardson v. United States, 100 Fed. 714 (1900); Lewis Blue
Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 57 L. Ed. 1083 (1913).
262. Speights v. Colleton County, 100 S. C. 304, 84 S. E. 873, 874 (1915).
263. 1 McCord 67 (1821).
264. "The ebbing and flowing of the tide cannot give character to our
rivers as it appears to do in England. In rivers which are navigable for
many hundred miles above the flowing of the tide some other criterion
must be resorted to. But that does not alter the principle, where it is ad-
mitted that the stream is not navigable."
" ... In the subdivisions of land which are daily taking place in our
country, we find that the most permanent boundaries, such as rivers, creeks,
and roads are usually sought for. The occupants on neither side can
claim an exclusive right; because it is the boundary of both. They cannot
have a common interest, because there is no community of interest in the
soil on each side. Policy forbids it, because it would lead to endless con-
tention and strife. The various purposes of machinery to which a creek or
river may be applied requires that each should exercise an exclusive right
to the middle.... " (Italics added.) Id. at 69-70.
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divided into two parts by a navigable waterway was held
not to create an impediment so as to prevent possession of
all by possession of that part on one side of the river only,
because possession does not depend upon navigability or the
size of a river; if it did, the benefit of the rules of possession
would be denied when most needed.20 5
Where executors sold to defendant all the right and title in
a tract as shown by plat, which included one half of the
Enoree River to the thread or center line thereof, and later
sued on the bond covering the purchase price, the court re-
fused to set aside the jury verdict for plaintiff-executors for
alleged failure of consideration on the ground that the river
was capable of being made navigable. The Court repudiated
the common law test of navigability as to inland rivers, saying
that it would not be suitable to South Carolina, where many
large rivers are navigable many miles from the tidal influ-
ence. 266 This case held that landowner may own the soil
under such a river, subject to the public uses for navigation
and fishery, and that a river cannot be considered navigable,
"the natural obstructions of which prevent the passage of
boats of any description whatsoever.' 267 A later case, con-
sidering the application of the common law, stated that it
had not been changed, but added the Court would not likely
extend it to any stream above the fall line.
268
265. Alston v. Collins, 2 Speers 450 (1844); Brandon v. Grinke, 1 Nott
& McCord 365 (1818).
266. Exors. of Cates v. Wadlington, 1 McCord 579 (1822).
267. Id. at 582.
268. "The occasion does not require any exact definition to be now
given of a navigable river, according to the law of this State, in which
the ownership of the soil shall not belong to the riparian proprietors;
perhaps the principal occasion of dispute on the subject has been the
use of the term navigable, which has a popular signification different from
the technical one which is given by the common law. We can, however,
safely say, that no authoritative decision has yet been made in this State
which has changed the common law on the subject.
The rivers of our own State are not of remarkable magnitude, and
whether we adhere to the common law definition or consider as navigable
all rivers that may be navigated by sea vessels, or all that are by nature
floatable, we hesitate not to declare that this Court, if it should feel itself
at liberty, from considerations of public convenience, to assume legis-
lative discretion in the matter, is not likely by any decision to extend the
rules which, by the common law, are applicable to navigable rivers, to any
stream above those falls which by nature obstructed the serviceable use
of its water for transportation. Above those falls, as below, the right
of the public to improve a river, and to use it as a highway, subsists:
to that the proprietary right in the soil is subject: but so subject the
proprietary right exists in the owners to whom it has been granted
above the falls, at any rate, as we may now safely say. (Italics added.)
"And so in regard to fishing in the rivers. 'A right of fishing in navi.
gable or tide waters is a common right. In rivers and streams not navi-
1962] 337
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In the case of Boatwright v. Bookman,20- 9 the Court, dis-
cussing a fishery on the Congaree River, recognized that
whether the public is the actual owner of the soil covered by
water or has merely a servitude for the public interest for
a highway by water would depend, perhaps, on the grants or
on the acts regulating the issuing of grants for lands, neither
of which had been placed in evidence, but held that in either
case the public rights to navigation and fishery were to be
protected.
2 7 0
In State v. Duncan271 a motion for new trial by a de-
fendant, convicted of nuisance by a jury for obstructing
Cummings Creek on the west side of the City of Charleston,
was granted because of insufficient evidence as to whether
this tidal creek, which ran dry at low tide, was a public way
or a private way, obstruction of the former only being in-
dictable.
(2) Early changes by statute
We have seen that the status of a navigable stream as a
natural boundary was recognized by the enactment of the
fence law of 1827 (by which a navigable stream was deemed
the statutory equivalent of a fence), and applied as to an
island surrounded by tidal, navigable waters,272 and as to
marshlands actually unenclosed save for such act, without
which the digging of a cut through such marshlands would
not have been adverse to the owner.
273
It has been held that appropriations by the legislature to
improve a stream or placing such stream under charge of
public functionaries rendered it a public highway.
2 74
By statute, erecting a dam across any stream used for
navigation by boats or rafts of timber was made a nui-
gable as tide waters, the owners of the soil over which they flow have
at common law the exclusive right of fishing, each on his own soil, unless
some other person can shew a grant or prescription for a common of
piscary, in derogation of the right naturally attached to the ownership
of the soil: and such right is held subject to the public use of the waters
as a highway, and to the free passage of fish, and in subordination to
the regulations to be prescribed by the Legislature for the general good.'
5 Kent's Corn 418 .. . " McCullough v. Wall, 4 Rich. 68, 83, 85, 86, 87
(1950).
269. Rice 447 (1839).
270. Id. at 450-451.
271. MicCord 403 (1821).
272. Fripp v. Hasell, supra, notes 193-218.
273. Heyward v. Chisolm, supra, notes 218, 248.
274. State v. Thompson, 2 Strob. 12 (1847). "
[Vol. 14
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sance.2 75 In one case, an indictment and conviction for plac-
ing a dam across such a stream was held not to lie, and a
new trial was granted because the stream was not identified
as having been improved by the legislature or by a riparian
owner who had improved it, nor was it shown that it was a
stream which was used for navigation at the time the Act
of 1825 was passed.
27 6
(3) Phosphate cases
In the Pacific Guano case, the South Carolina Supreme
Court stated that the term "navigable" is equivocal, in that
rivers were navigable if subject to the tidal flow at common
law, while "in our statutes and popular speech, 'navigable'
rivers means those which may be navigated by ships or
boats . .. "277 The Court added that the "doctrine that all
tidal streams are navigable is purely technical .... ,,278 The
test of navigability approved here was navigability in fact,
and by that test certain streams were found non-navigable
and the beds thereof belonged to the riparian land owner,
while as to navigable streams, the beds belonged to the State.
The rule of construction (that a grant of the shore adjoining
tidal navigable streams carries only to high water mark)
was limited to "channels in which the tide ebbs and flows"1
2 70
unless "altered by law or modified by custom,"2 80 and this
provided a basis for possible future distinction between "chan-
nels" in which the tide flows, and "marshlands" over which
the tide flows. In the Pacific Guano case, marshlands were
admitted to belong to the landowner, and beds only were
before the court. However, the Court felt obligated to add,
as it had done in the McCullough case, that no law or judicial
decision had changed the common law in South Carolina.
28'
In the Pinclcney case, marshlands were directly involved,
and the court held that the deed of the United States Direct
Tax Commission did not carry the marshlands within the
natural boundaries of the navigable streams stated by the
deed, save for one tract expressly granted because of the
275. 6 Stat. at Large 269 (1825), cited in State v. Collum, 2 Speers 581
(1844).
276. State v. Hickson, 5 Rich. 447 (1852).
277. 22 S. C. 50, 75 (1884).
278. Id. at 76.
279. Id. at 79.
280. Id. at 83-84.
281. Id. at 75-77.
19621
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rule of construction strictly applied, that a conveyance which
calls for boundaries on tidal navigable streams carried title
only to high water mark. Evidence of usage was held not
produced 8 2 or was deemed insufficient, as the Court found
no authoritative reason to change the rule.
28 3
In the Oakc Point Mines case (a Circuit Court decision) it
was held that the test of navigability is general and common
use for some purpose of trade or agriculture.284 The bed of
the navigable stream was held to belong to the state, but the
soil "between ordinary high water and low water mark in
said creek, embraced within the lines of said grant" was
held to belong to the riparian owner. The rule of construction
(that titles to lands on navigable streams carry only high
water mark) was not mentioned, but, presumably went out of
the case when the Court found that the statutes of the legis-
lature conclusively proved that marshlands were the subject
of grant.283 The Court said of navigability:
. . . The tendency of American decisions has been to
restrict riparian proprietorship even upon navigable
rivers above the tides, and not to enlarge it in respect
to navigable streams in which the tide ebbs and flows.
Whenever the common law test of navigability has been
repudiated, the common law consequences of navigability
have been held to attach. Nothing more can be claimed
under the grant presumed from the possession of the
upland than would result from an express grant calling
for the creek as a boundary, conceding that usage would
carry the line to low water mark .... 2
8 6
In the Farmers Mining Company case,287 the Court stated
that the Pacific Guano case88 had repudiated the common
law, and announced that "to be navigable, a stream should
have sufficient depth and width of water to float useful com-
merce.... The test is navigable capacity, and not that the
surroundings should be such that it may be useful for the
purpose of commerce."
28 9
282. Id. at 508-509.
283. Ibid.
284. Id. at 597.
285. See Text, page 41, supra.
286. 22 S. C. 50, 602 (1884).
287. 42 S. C. 138, 19 S. E. 963 (1894), supra, notes 180, 198, 201.
288. Supra, note 275.
289. 19 S. E. at 970-971.
[Vol. 14
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The Court also distinguished navigable waters of the
United States, namely, waters having connections with other:
highways and being subject, therefore, to the laws of inter--
state commerce from the navigable waters of the state (waterss
not subject to interstate commerce laws) .290
(4) Trespassing upo. p iivate m rshlaxMs
In the United States Circuit Court case of Chisolm r.
Caines, et al.,291 plaintiffs, lessees of marshlands and creeks
in Georgetown County which were a part of the Cartaret
Barony granted in 1733,292 brought suit to restrain repeated
trespasses. A temporary restraining order was issued, and
defendants were ruled to show cause why they should not
be cited for contempt for violating the restraining order. The
answers denied ownership of the marshes and creeks.293
The State of South Carolina intervened by information,
and set up the claim of the state, denying the ownership of
complainant's lessors. Circuit Judge Simonton then ordered
issues to be made up as to whether the lands were granted
by the Crown before the Revolution, or by the state there-
after, as to which the burden was on complainants; but, if
the grant were produced in court, then the presumption aris-
ing from possession would be available, and the burden would
be on defendants to show better title.
After the rendition of the opinion ordering issues to be
made, the state withdrew her intervention, the issues at law
290. "The third condition enumerated by the Circuit Judge is ... 'con-
nections with other highways.' This test has only been applied in cases
where the question was whether a stream was a navigable water of the
United States, so as to subject them to the laws of interstate commerce,
that do not apply to navigable streams under the control of the state.
Among these conditions is that mentioned by the Circuit Judge." 19 S. E.
971.
291. 67 Fed. 285 (1894), supra, note 21.
292. See note 77, which statute was held by Judge Simonton in this
case to constitute recognition of the Cartaret grant by South Carolina.
67 Fed. at 289.
293. In the Order and Opinion on motion to set aside restraining order,
filed January 25, 1894, but not reported, the fact of ownership of marsh-
lands was specifically recognized:
"From time immemorial the right of individuals to obtain exclusive
possession and ownership of lands below high and low water mark, not-
the bed of a navigable stream, has been recognized in the Colony and in.
the State of South Carolina. Large portions of the City of Charleston,
were once covered at high water and upon them are lots filled up, houses
erected and buildings. The whole coast of South Carolina, back of the.
sea Islands, shows a vast extent of marsh land, extending from the inner-
shore, and lining the banks of the navigable rivers. These marshes were-
used constantly by the riparian owners for fertilizing purposes and food,
for Cattle ..... " In Equity #57, Clerk of Court U. S. D. C., E. D. S. C.
1962]
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were withdrawn, and the case was heard on the bill, answer
and testimony.
In deciding whether plaintiffs' landlord owned the marsh-
lands and creeks or whether they were navigable waters and
subject to the jus publicum, the right of the sovereign over
-marsh lands was stated to be a matter of local law, and they
were held grantable under South Carolina law. The marsh-
lands were treated separately from the creeks, and were held
,to be "not aids to, but obstructions to navigation.
'294
Judge Simonton gave the following tests of navigability:
It is evident that to make a body of water a public,
navigable stream, it must be accessible to the public. The
(essential characteristic of a navigable stream is that it
is, or is capable of becoming, a public highway (Ball v.
Herbert, infra.), a means open to the public of passing
from one place, where they have a right to be, to another,
294. "It would seem that there is a great distinction between the shores
of the great ocean, the beds of harbors, the channels of rivers and
highways of commerce, and these mud shoals cast up by the currents on the
sides of harbors and streams. The former must always be kept open for
publie use, commerce, trade, and pleasure. The latter can be separated
rom any public use, and can be vested in individuals or corporations, at
the will of the sovereign power. They are not aids to, but obstructions to,
navigation, and can be utilized for the public good in any way the sovereign
may decide. And, when it can be done without detriment to the lands
and waters remaining, they can always be disposed of, and vested abso-
lutely in private persons." Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S., at
pages 456, 457, 13 Sup. Ct. 110.
"What of the creeks which penetrate these marshes? Although the
.zovereign can determine for itself, in the matter of marsh lands, and can
1grant them to private persons in fee, giving them title to the exclusive
,use of them, it is not competent for the sovereign to grant the exclusive
'use of public navigable streams, bays, and harbors, or the beds thereof,
too as to prevent the use of them by the public for commerce, travel, or
even pleasure. The title of the sovereign in public navigable streams is
subject to the public use. It is held by the sovereign as the representative
of the public, and in trust for them, - a part of its prerogative rights,
and not as private property. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367. Nor can
the sovereign, by any act, divest itself or the property of this public use.
Every grantee from it is affected by the use. The only exception, perhaps,
is the erection of docks and wharves, and piers of bridges, and the like,
on the beds of navigable streams. See Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black 23.
These are aids to commerce, navigation, and passage, and promote the
public good. They are lawful, so long as they do not unreasonably impede
the navigability of the stream. See Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall 389. The
crucial question in this case, therefore, is: Are these creeks, or any of
them, - those which bound and those which permeate these marshes, -
public, navigable streams, or capable of becoming navigable streams?
If they are, although they may have passed with the marshes which sur-
round them, they are held subject to the use of the public for passage
and navigation. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. at page 13. 14 Sup. Ct.
548." (Italics added.) 67 Fed. at 291.
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in which they have the same right. The Montello, 11 Wall
411, 20 Wall 439.295
All the cases concur in treating as the test of a navi-
gable stream, that it is or can be used as a highway of
commerce, over which trade or travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade or travel
on water. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall 557; Hickock v. Hine,
23 Ohio St. 523; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9. In order
to be of use for the purposes of commerce, trade or travel,
the stream must be a means of intercourse and com-
munication with points between which commerce, trade
or travel is conducted, and conducted by the public. The
public may use any highway for any purpose of trade,
travel or pleasure. But it must be a highway ... So a
waterway into a man's land, surrounded on all its sides
by his land, whatever its capacity, cannot be said to be
a highway, and so open to the public for its use of
trade, travel, or commerce.
There is a case in South Carolina which seems to con-
flict with these views. Heyward v. Mining Co., 42 S. C.
138, 19 S. E. 963 (1894). In that case the Supreme Court
of South Carolina goes beyond any case theretofore de-
cided by it, and holds that a creek having an outlet on
a navigable stream, and losing itself in the private lands
of a citizen, which surrounded it on all sides, without
another terminus, is a navigable stream to this extent,
at least: that the state owns the phosphate rock in its
bed.29
6
Navigable water of the United States was stated to re-
quire a continuous connection, in whole or in part, between
different places in different states, but if it lies wholly within
a state and is only navigable between different places within
a state, it is not navigable water of the United States, but
only of that state, the essential characteristic of navigability
in each case being as a highway between places. 297 After
holding certain named streams navigable or non-navigable,
respectively, complainants were granted injunctive relief as
to 'non-navigable streams, and also the marshes, but not as
295. 67 Fed. at 292.
296. 67 Fed. at 294.
297. 67 Fed. at 294.
1962]
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to the streams found navigable. This injunction is still in
force, but only as to those originally enjoined or privies
thereto.20
8
Judge Simonton remarked in the course of his opinion
that there was no line of South Carolina cases following the
rule of Pacific Guano and Heyward v. Farmers Mining Co.
His statement should be interpreted in the light of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins2 9 wherein the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the federal courts follow the latest adjudi-
cations of state courts regarding statutes and substantive
laws. The rules of substantive law to be applied in any fed-
eral case would be those announced in the South Carolina
cases, subject to applicable statutes, such as the Submerged
Lands Act.
(5) Oyster cases and Cape Romaine
In Alston v. Limehouse, et al.,300 and companion case Don-
aldson v. Nesbit, et al.,30' plaintiff in each case claimed title
through grant to John, Lord Cartaret.30 2 In each case, plain-
tiff landowner alleged trespass of defendants on lands for
gathering oysters, and prayed injunctive relief. Injunctions
pendente lite were granted by one circuit judge, and orders
of reference were made by another. Defendants contested
plaintiffs' titles, alleging that the lands where the alleged
trespasses took place were public lands held by the state in
trust for the public, and defendants were rightfully there.
Defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court upheld the
grant of temporary injunctive relief, but held that the order
298. In 1897, 1901 and 1903, additional persons were named as re-
spondents and the above injunction ordered applied to them also.
In 1953, a rule was brought to show cause why certain named persons
should not be enjoined from trespassing in the described marshlands and
cited for contempt in not observing the injunction already issued. The
order of the District Court, E. D. S. C., filed March 20, 1954, held that
the present rule 65 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lim-
ited rules to show cause in such cases to persons who were agents or in
active concert with the original parties, and since such connection was
not shown, they could not be held to be guilty of contempt. The order
"emphatically rejected" the contention that the marsh lands and creeks
in question belonged to the State of South Carolina, as the state was a
party to Chisolm v. Caines and is bound by the decree therein, and has
no interest in the marshlands described. The court also held that in-
junctive relief would lie to secure the owner of the premises against
trespass. Equity case #57, Clerk of Court, U. S. D. C., E. D. S. C.
299. 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
300. 60 S. C. 559, 39 S. E. 188 (1901).
301. 60 S. C. 570, 39 S. E. 967 (1901).
802. See notes 77, 289.
[Vol. 14
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of the circuit court was binding only as to the issue of tem-
porary relief and could neither preclude defendant's right
to jury trial, nor establish facts solely within the jury's pre-
rogative. Since plaintiff alleged fee simple title, the Court
held a jury trial was necessary to permit proof of title, and
that the legal issues should have been tried before determin-
ing permanent injunctive relief.
It is worth noting that the order of the lower court said
that the locations where defendants took oysters and whether
such locations were navigable, were questions of fact, and
that the rights of plaintiffs under the grant and their extent
to high or to low water mark, were questions of law. The
Court gave the following tests of navigability as to the chan-
nels of streams as compared with the "navigability" of marsh-
lands:
In this country the tides have no relevance to navi-
gability. It was otherwise in England, whence the com-
mon law and its terminology came. There tide waters
and navigable waters were convertible terms. Here, if
a water course is navigable, it is so because the depth
and width of it are sufficient to float useful commerce.
If the depth and width of a stream are augmented by
a periodical increase of water, called 'tide', that fact may
make the stream navigable at those points in it where
it is so in fact, to wit, in its channel, but not navigable
where it is not so in fact, to wit, out of the channel in the
marshes. The state owns (because it has refused to
sell) the beds of navigable streams.3 03  (Emphasis
added.)
In the Cape Romaine case, plaintiff alleged ownership under
stated grants; trespass on the lands granted; and removal
of oysters by defendants and prayed for damages and in-
junction. Plaintiff's evidence of possession, besides deeds
and grants in chain of title, consisted of payment of prop-
erty taxes, posting, leasing to oyster canning concerns, em-
ployment of persons to protect, burning of oysters to make
lime, and taking of shellfish for food and canning. Both
sides showed that the land was mostly covered by water at
high tide, and defendants showed that it had been leased
to them by the State Board of Fisheries. The master found
303. 60 S. C. 559, 39 S. E. 188, 190 (1901).
19621
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for defendants, and when the matter was argued before the
circuit judge an order was passed reciting that the parties
agreed that the narrow issue was plaintiff's title to "the land
between high and low water mark in the navigable streams
within the territory described in the complaint." The circuit
court held simply that plaintiff failed to prove title to such
land, and judgment was given for defendants.
Plaintiff excepted, alleging error in holding that plaintiff
had failed to prove title to land between high and low water
in the navigable streams bordering and intersecting plain-
tiff's lands, on the grounds: (1) that grants in chain of title
carried to low water mark, subject to rights of navigation and
as to phosphates, and plaintiff had never lost or forfeited its
rights to hold to low water mark and (2) that the order
extended to all of the lands of plaintiff, whereas it should
not have included two grants from the state, the plats for
which expressly showed that the state had granted to low
water mark, and for a period greater than twenty years, so
that the state and the public had been out of possession for
more than the statutory period sufficient to presume a grant
and could assert no title save for navigation and phosphates.
The respondent's brief on the first page specifically and
unequivocally stated that plaintiff had misinterpreted the
extent of the lands involved and had extended the scope of
the case by taking the position that all of the streams in-
volved were navigable. The lack of any definition of navi-
gability must have led plaintiff to throw its property rights
into the breach in this case. At any rate, the statement of
respondents on the first page of their brief is striking be-
cause they were trying to limit the issues to less than ten
per cent of the streams in the areas covered by grants in
plaintiff's chains of title and also because the Court and
plaintiff completely failed to limit the issues and the hold-
ings to those specific, navigable streams involved and to
lands in the channels of those navigable streams only. This
statement is reprinted here verbatim:
Note: It is stated by the plaintiff-appellant that all
of the streams in the marsh involved are navigable. This
is absolutely inaccurate. Not over ten per cent of the
streams in these marshes involved are navigable. There
is a network of non-navigable streams about which there
[Vol. 14
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss3/1
TITLES TO MARSHLANDS
is no question, and it is most misleading and inaccu-
rately stated, as the contention of the defendants is lim-
ited only to the navigable streams, and the judge only-
found that title was lacking between high and low water
mark in the navigable streams.
Despite this plain attempt of respondents to confine the
issues to those ten per cent of the streams that were navi-
gable, plaintiff threw all of their titles to non-navigable areas
into the case, and all titles were lost in the resulting con-
fusion.
The opinion of the Supreme Court per Mr. Justice Carter,
stated the question to be this:
... has the plaintiff title to low water mark in navi-
gable streams, the testimony showing that all streams
named were navigable, and there being no proof that
any oysters were gathered or other trespass committed
between high and low water mark on the shores of
Bulls Bay, or in Bulls Bay? 30 4
The Court answered this question before commencing the
body of the opinion. "We have made a careful examination of
the record and fail to find proof of title in the plaintiff be-
tween high and low water mark in the navigable streams on
the land in question." 30 5 (Emphasis added.) It may be that
plaintiff stated itself out of court by agreeing that the ques-
tion before the Court related to navigable streams, without
distinguishing marshlands in any way from navigable
streams. Throughout the opinion, the unanswered questions,
what is a navigable stream, and are marshlands navigable
streams, arise to plague the reader and the Court. The Court
seems never to have decided definitely, whether the streams
were on the land or whether the land was in the streams.
Thus, says the majority opinion, assuming plaintiff proved
title to the lands described, "it does not follow that title was
proved to 'low water mark in navigable streams' in ques-
tion."306 This poses an ambiguous assumption, for it was
shown, as the dissenting opinion of Justice Cothran says, that
" . . . practically every foot of the 34,290 acres (with the
exception of 6.2 acres on Cassena Island), was entirely sub-
merged at high tide, . . .,,,07 and no other boundary line for
304. 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E. 434, 436 (1928).
305. Ibid.
306. Ibid.
307. 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E. 434, 439 (1928).
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lands lying below high water mark is possible except low
water mark, unless the streams be deemed non-navigable, in
which case the boundary line may carry to the center thereof.
If title be assumed to lands in question, for purposes of an
hypothetical question, and if it be proven that all of them
lie below high water mark, to what boundary was title as-
sumed if not to the low water mark? The answer of the ma-
jority is that since the language of the grants and deeds
did not specifically use the words "to low water mark", then
the unalterable rule must apply, that the boundary is con-
strued to be high water mark, even if several express grants
from the state using the terms "marsh" or "marshland" and
sealed with the great seal of the state, (which should import
at least some consideration), be reduced to the worthless
status of a "scrap of paper." Therefore, the real basis of
the holding in the Cape Romaine case was the rule of con-
struction, strictly applied, that a conveyance of lands butting
on tidal navigable streams carries title only to high water
mark, and that only language intending to show grant to
low water mark is admissable to mitigate the strictness of the
rule. The Supreme Court held that whether or not the proof
established title in the owner of land bounded on navigable
streams, was a question of fact for the lower court.308
In stating the law which it decided to apply, the Court
cited: (1) the holding of Shively v. Bowlby,30 9 wherein Mr.
Justice Gray gave opinion that the common law rule that high
water mark is the boundary is in force in South Carolina,310
but did not add that the same opinion admits both language in
the grant and long usage to indicate a contrary boundary,311
(2) the holding of the Pacific Guano case involving creeks
only, wherein the state did not even try to claim marshlands,
but admitted titles thereto in defendant,312 (3) the Pinckney
case, which, although it was the first case to apply the strict
rule that land abutting on tidal navigable streams carried
title only to high water mark, nevertheless recognized title
to one tract of marshland, 313 and (4) the Farmers Mining
, 308. The heading of headnote 7 reads "navigable," as does the content
of the opinion under number 7, while the body of headnote 7 reads "non-
navigable." 146 S. E. 434, 435 and 437-438.
309. 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894).
310. 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E 434, 437 (1928).
311. 148 S. C. 428, Id. at 439.
312. Supra, note 201.
313. Supra, note 282.
348 [VoI. 14
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Company case, wherein the court reversed on other grounds
and did not disturb the finding that the grant to the marsh-
lAids included all within its boundaries, if non-navigable, and
stated that the state is estopped by a grant from claiming
lands covered by tidal though not navigable waters. 14
Appellant contended that if the grants in question do not
carry to low water mark they convey nothing, to which the
court answered:
We do not agree with this contention. In the first
place, the testimony on which appellant relies as show-
ing or tending to show that a large portion of the land
is covered by water at high tide is not conclusive of the
question. Neither does the fact that the land described
in some of the deeds is referred to as marsh land, to
which attention is called, settle the question. Then, too,
there are other facts in the case to be considered. While a
marsh is land usually wet and soft and commonly covered
wholly or partly with water and is often referred to as
a swamp, it is also known as a meadow which remains
green during the dry seasons. 38 C. J. 1363. 315
Marshland subject to tidal flow does not bear too close
comparison with fresh-water green meadows.
As to the meaning to be given the word "marshland," if
the court was doubtful that it meant lands submerged under
salt water at high tide the case could have been remanded
for a new trial, as recommended in the dissenting opinion.
The court next considers that geological changes may have
occurred. "What was an island when the deeds were executed
in 1840 or 1855 may now be a marsh or land constantly or
continuously covered with water. This would be no reason,
however, for reading into the deeds a meaning not intended
at the time of execution."316 As to this, aside from the pre-
sumption in favor of grants under the great seal of the
state, that the lands were validly granted and carried the
contents, if the court desired to admit external evidence of
intention at time of granting, presumably acts of usage would
also be admissible to show what grantee thought was carried
'by the grant. Again, geological changes may be sudden or
314. Supra, note 180.
315. 148 S. C. 428,146 S. E. 434, 437 (1928)
316. Ibid.
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gradual, and if the court had no reason to believe the al-
luvion or reliction of any of these lands was anything other
than gradual, then it had no reason to assume that gradual
changes had returned the title of any of the granted lands
to the state, if the rules of the common law stated by Black-
stone be followed.8 17 And, granting that sudden changes in
wet lands occur and if land wash partly away or if it build
up partly does the owner lose title entirely because what was
once an island is now under water, or vice versa? If a grant
conveys all land within certain identifiable natural boundaries
has its meaning been changed by a subsequent judicial deter-
mination that, regardless of the presumption attaching in
favor of grants, nevertheless, nothing has been conveyed
by such grant?
The majority of the court next concluded that a surveyor's
notation on one of the plats, that the boundary was low water
mark on Bull's Bay did not have any bearing on the question
of whether grants bounded on navigable tidal streams were
intended to convey to low water mark, as " . . . it does not
appear that Bull's Bay is a navigable stream... ",318 If any
of the lands abutted upon low water mark of Bull's Bay the
surveyor's note should have been accorded at least to have
had "bearing on the question involved in the appeal," be-
cause the agreed statement of facts in the transcript on ap-
peal contained the statement that" . . . the surveyor (states)
that on Bull's Bay, an arm of the sea not a navigable stream,
the line is at 'low water mark,' and on the same plat con-
taining navigable streams, no such language is used," and
"there is no testimony that any oysters were gathered or
cultivated, or any stakes driven in Bull's Bay."3 19 Here,
again, plaintiff may have stated away part of its case by
agreeing that Bull's Bay, "an arm of the sea" was not a
navigable stream, because, if Bull's Bay be not navigable, it
could not be questioned that it is at least as "navigable" as
marshland or "shore" that goes completely dry twice a day.
Besides, "arm of the sea" is defined as "a portion of the sea
projecting inland, in which tide ebbs and flows. 5 Coke,
107.1120 If it is a physical fact of which judicial notice
may be taken, that water seeks its own level, then at a given
317. Supra, note 56.
318. 148 S. c. 428,146 S. E. 434, 437 (1928).
319. 148 S. C. 428, Id. at 436.
320. BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
[Vol. i"4
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time and location, namely, at low tide and at low water mark,
a given tract of marshland surrounded by identifiable water-
courses and having one boundary at low water mark on
Bull's Bay, could hardly have another boundary at any other
place than low water mark.
After dismissing plaintiff's claim of possession for over
twenty years as "without proof ' 321 the majority opinion
concludes:
It is conceded for the purpose of this appeal that the
plaintiff owns all of the land contained within the
boundaries appearing in the deeds executed by the
agent of the state, unless such boundaries be construed
to include lands between high and low water mark in
the navigable streams, but, as we view the case, the
plaintiff has failed to prove title to the lands between
high and low water mark in the navigable streams, as
held by the circuit judge, for the reasons we have stated
above in connection with the authorities cited. The title
to land below high-water mark on tidal navigable
streams, under the well-settled rule, is in the state,
not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in trust for
public purposes.322 (Emphasis added.)
As a matter of semantics, all land abutting or adjoining
directly upon an identifiable stream may be said to lie along,
upon, or "on" such stream, while only the soil or land ac-
tually lying within or inside the banks of a stream or under
its channel may be said to be "in" that stream in the sense
of within or inside it, and conversely, water may be said
to be "upon" the land that it covers. Salt water is "upon"
or on marshland twice a day - but it is on or upon all land
below low water mark all of the time. It is true that the
banks of tidal navigable streams may disappear from view
at high tide, but, as pointed out in the reported opinion
of the lower court in Alston v. Limehouse, supra, "if the
depth and width of a stream are augmented by a periodical
increase of water, called 'tide', that fact may make the
stream navigable at those points in it where it is so in
fact, to wit, in its channel but not navigable where it is not
so in fact, to wit, out of the channel in the marshes." If
every acre of marshland, no matter where located, when
321. 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E. 434, 438 (1928).
322. Ibid.
1962] 3 1
17
Horlbeck: Titles to Marshlands in South Carolina, Part II
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
granted, how used or for what period, be held to be navi-
gable because abutting upon tidal navigable streams or be-
cause located under normal high water mark, then no private
person may own any marsh at all, a result scarcely intended
by all of the colonial officials of England and officers of
the state in time past, including expert surveyors, whose ef-
forts may be accorded the status of scraps of papers sub-
sequent judicial interpretation.
Judge Cothran dissented in part, as follows:
There can be no question as to the correctness of the
principle, that, under ordinary circumstances, a grant
by the state to land bounded by tidal navigable water
passes no title below high-water mark. (Citing cases.)
I do not believe, however, that this principle can justly
be applied where the state is presumed to know that,
if this rule be applied, its solemn grant, with the great
seal of the state affixed, is but a 'scrap of paper.'
If there was nothing in these islands and marsh lands
which the state, by reason of the fact that they were
entirely submerged at high tide, could convey except
the land bounded by low-water mark, common fairness
would require that the grants should be so construed.
The cases cited, establishing the general rule as stated,
all involved tracts of land upon which there was land
of both descriptions, above and below the high-water
mark; in the absence of a specific extension to low-water
mark, it was but logical to declare the rule establishing
the high-water mark as the limit of proprietorship. When,
as in the case at bar, there is no high-water mark, and
of course no land above it, the logic fails; the grant
can have no effect at all unless the limit of proprietorship
is extended to low water mark.
. . . . .. : *
There is a marked distinction between grants of land
between high and low water mark, which is considered
the "shore", and grants of land that is always submerged,
land below low-water mark. The first class is considered
vacant land, and may be granted by the public land au-
thorities as such; the second class is considered a part
of the sovereign possessions of the state, in trust per-
(Vol. 14
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petual for the benefit of the public, and may not be
granted except by an act of the General Assembly.
It seems to be clear therefore, that all of this land
limited by low-water mark was subject to grants by
the state as vacant land and was conveyed by the proper
state authorities, that the state intended to con-
vey all that it possessed, which was the entire islands,
with the exception of the land below low-water mark,
and that the plaintiff has established its title thereto.
I think, therefore, that the decree of the circuit court
should be reversed, and the case remanded to that court
for a new trial. Nothing herein contained is intended
as an adjudication of any issue of fact; all such issues
are intended to be left open for such new trial.
In Cape Romaine, although the agreed issue involved only
title to lands in tidal navigable streams, which were less
than ten percent of the streams in the involved areas, the
Court went beyond the question involved and included not
only non-navigable creeks but also marshlands and even
islands in its ruling. Since the ruling went beyond the agreed
question on appeal, there is good reason for confining to
the realm of dicta, so much of the opinion as went beyond,
affirming the opinion of the court below. Certainly the ap-
plication of the rule as to public trust was erroneously ex-
tended from beds of navigable streams to include marshlands,
and should be regarded as dicta, as should its subsequent
citation in the Rice Hope case.
In a subsequent case, it was held that title to oyster bot-
toms is a legal question for the courts and not for the Board
of Fisheries, and the method of procedure used in the Cape
Romaine case for bringing the matter of title before the
Court was approved.
323
In a recent case in Georgetown County,324 the state brought
action against defendant to restrain digging of a canal and
yacht basin, specifically alleging that the state is the owner
of "all marsh and tide lands below the mean high water
mark of the ocean and the arms thereof except such tide
and marsh lands as have been ceded or granted to indi-
viduals", and that such canal would disturb the oyster beds,
323. Jones v. State Board of Fisheries, 161 S. C. 309, 159 S. E. 651
(1931).
324. State of South Carolina v. Southpoint Corporation, Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Georgetown County, Judgment Roll 6318 (1956).
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pollute the waters, etc. A temporary restraining order was
issued but later dismissed, and was followed by a petition
for rule to show cause and order to show cause before one
of the justices of the Supreme Court why restraining order
should not issue pendente lite, in that the defendant had com-
menced dredging the canal. No order was issued however,
and by order of December 7, 1956, the sole issue of trespass
was resolved to the question of the boundary line of de-
fendant's lands, which was set by the order of the boundary
of the canal which had been dug, which was declared to be
the high water mark, and the dividing line between the lands
of the defendant and the marshlands of the plaintiff.
(6) Ricelands, Power Projects and Federal Cases
While ricelands are not in exactly the same category with
unenclosed marshlands, because they are usually enclosed
and cultivated, nevertheless, they have been regarded as
submerged lands in certain particulars, and a showing of
a grant to them has been thought expedient in several cases
wherein titles have come before the courts.
In Lynah, et al. '. United States, 25 and in Williams v.
U. S.326 actions were brought by owners of plantations along
the Savannah River to obtain just compensation for alleged
taking of rice fields by the general government for necessary
improvements in the navigation of the said river. The im-
provements consisted in building dikes and other structures
downstream (toward the ocean) of plantiff's lands, causing
the natural level of the water in the said river to rise, with
the result that the rice fields could no longer be properly
drained, and became soggy, sour and unfit for rice culti-
vation.3
27
325. 106 Fed. 121 (1901).
326. 104 Fed. 50 (1901).
327. It was the distinguishing feature of coastal South Carolina rice
culture that the canals for draining and flooding the fields emptied
through embankments at and by means of trunks. At any low tide the
water in the rice fields could be lowered or drained off entirely by open-
ing the trunks, because the mouths thereof were so placed and dug as to
be above the natural mean low water mark of the river outside the
embankment. Also, because said trunks were below mean high-water mark
of the river outside the field, water could be admitted into the enclosed
area of the rice field so as to raise the water level on the rice. Most of
the rice grown along the rivers of the Lowcountry was subject to some
tidal influence, whether more or less depending upon proximity or distance
from the open ocean, and was dependent upon tidal rise and fall of some
degree, together with the use of reserves of water in impounded swamps,
to control the level or amount of water in the rice fields. See United
States v. Williams, 104 Fed. 50, 52.
354 [V7ol. 14
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In each case a majority of the U. S. Supreme Court 328
affirmed the judgment of the lower court for plaintiff land-
owner. In each case title was admitted. The main question
was whether flooding rice lands constituted a taking, the
majority holding that it did and such taking was compensable,
while the minority, per Mr. Justice White, held that the owner
of land below high water mark acquired no such easement
or servitude in the bed of a navigable river by embanking
his lands that he could exact that the level of the river water
not be changed or raised, and that if there were any in-
equity, the Congress should appropirate funds to pay for it.
In the case of Lachicotte and Springs v. Ford,29 plaintiffs
brought action against defendant for flooding their planta-
tion, Woodside, by turning loose waters from defendant's
plantation, Rice Hope, both on the Santee River, in such
manner as to overflow the rice fields of the former. De-
fendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
and was overruled in the circuit court. The Supreme Court
affirmed, saying that defendant had a right to flood his
own plantation with waters from North Santee River, but
his use of such waters would become unlawful when he there-
by also flooded plaintiffs' land, "in the absence of any grant,
license, or prescription authorizing the same." The Court
refused to take judicial notice of the rise and fall of the tides
as the cause of the flooding, although it stated that the
flow of the tides and the general geographical areas subject
thereto are judicially noticeable.
In Manigault v. Springs,330 a demurrer to bill in equity
to restrain erection of a dam across Kinloch Creek on the
Santee River, Georgetown County,331 was sustained although
complainant used this creek to carry rice from his plantation
to his mill over a mile away. Complainant's property was
opposite the mouth of this creek, and the court held he was
not proven to be a riparian owner. The parties had previ-
ously agreed that no dam was to be placed there, but an
act of the legislature in 1903 permitted a dam provided the
328. Lynah v. United States, 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. Ed. 539 (1902);
Williams v. United States, 188 U. S. 485, 47 L. Ed. 554 (1903). These
cases were distinguished in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Company
v. Briggs, and overruled thereby.
329. 58 S. C. 557, 36 S. E. 916 (1900).
330. 199 U. S. 473, 50 L. Ed. 274 (1905).
331. 123 Fed. 707 (1903).
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builders, respondents herein, pay damages to those harmed.
The lower court held that the creek was not navigable and
that the legislature could authorize it to be dammed. The
U. S. Supreme Court said the legislature might close it even
if it were navigable, as the S. C. Legislature had authority
under the police power to authorize a dam across a navi-
gable stream, despite the provisions of the State Constitution
that all navigable rivers shall remain forever public high-
ways.
In the Circuit Court case of Mullins Lumber Company v.
Blackwell, Secretary of State,8 2 the Secretary of State was
sued under code section 1-205, 1952 S. C. Code, requiring him
to take charge of State property not otherwise provided for
by law. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had taken charge
of many non-navigable streams belonging to plaintiff, which
constituted a cloud on title amounting to an appropriation to
the use of the public of private property without due process
of law, in violation of Amendment XIV, U. S. Constitution
and of Section 5, S. C. Constitution. The opinion was handed
down by Judge Lide, who concluded that certain canals were
artificial channels and private property of plaintiff, as were
certain other creeks and a lake wholly within plaintiff's
boundaries, while certain creeks which had been found navi-
gable by the U. S. War Department were navigable waters.
While the opinion stated that the finding of the War Depart-
ment would have been sufficient to determine the question of
navigability, it approved the test of navigability in the lead-
ing case of Pacific Guano, that a stream should have suffi-
cient depth and width of water to float useful commerce,
and added, as to a particular stream dry at low tide, that
under the Pacific Guano test the stream was not navigable
as a matter of law, and therefore, was the property of plain-
tiff.
This opinion held that this suit was really against the
State of South Carolina, which usually cannot be sued with-
out its consent, except when, as here, the State has uncon-
stitutionally taken the property of plaintiff. Judge Lide
concluded that there had been an unconstitutional taking of
plaintiff's property, and he particularly named the streams
832. Decree filed Nov. 22, 1948, Office of the Clerk of Court of George-
town County.
[Vol. 14
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and waters so attempted to be taken, and distinguished them
from those held to be public, navigable streams.
In the case of Rice Hope Plantation v. S. C. Public Service
Authority,33 plaintiff complained that the construction of
a dam across the Santee River and diversion of waters into'
the Cooper River permitted salt water to infiltrate its lands,
The Court, per Acting Associate Justice Lide, held that the
State of South Carolina has the same easement as the United
States over the land in the bed of a navigable stream, re-
peated the Cape Romaine dicta that lands lying between high
and low water marks of a navigable stream are held by the
state in trust for public purposes, including navigation, and
added:
But we do not deem it necessary or proper upon this
appeal to determine under what circumstances and by
what method, if any, title might be acquired by private
owners, because any such ownership would be, in our
opinion, subject to the dominant power of the govern-
ment (State and Federal) to control and regulate navi-
gable waters.834
The Court held also that the right to hunt and fish on one's
own premises is a right of property, and added later that
the water of the ocean and its bays of public watercourses
are part of the public domain, diversion of which by the state
may be authorized without compensation to riparian pro-
prietors, being a disposition of the public property but not
a taking of private property by eminent domain.
As in Cape Romaine, the citation by the Court in Rice Hope
of the rule as to marshlands being held in trust constituted
dicta, for the reason that the Court held that such lands were
subject to the power in State and Federal Governments to,
regulate navigation.
The act creating the authority states that it is owned com-
pletely by the people of South Carolina, and all net earnings.
not used for operation are supposed to reduce their tax bur-
dens. Although it was held to be an agency of the State,
the Court held the liability of the authority to a riparian
owner is substantially the same as if the United States were.
involved.
333. 216 S. C. 500, 59 S. E. 2d 132 (1950).
334. 216 S. C. 500, 580,59 S. E. 2d 132, 145 (1950).
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In the subsequent case of Early v. South, Carolina Public
,Service Authority, 35 the owners of a tract of land in George-
town County bordering on and traversed by both navigable
4nd non-navigable tidal streams and waters tributary to
the Santee River, sued for damages to their fast land, al-
leging that fresh water formerly in the Santee River had
been taken from that river and dumped into the Cooper
River, causing an invasion of salt water into the Santee River
and onto the lands of the plaintiff causing damage to timber,
loss of pasture land, etc. The area involved, including dikes
.and banks, lay wholly above mean high water mark, and was
,sed to pasture live stock. The salt water destroyed normal
-vegetation and rendered portion of the property useless for
-,pastureland, and some timber was killed.
The main question was whether the damage to plaintiff's
'land constituted a taking within the purview of Article I,
:Section 17, of the Constitution.
The Court outlined and reviewed the federal decisions on
this subject; pointed out that the concept of taking under
the Constitution includes any governmental action the effect
of which is to deprive the owner of the property; and that
damaging of property constituted a taking. The Court found
that the property in question had been damaged and there-
fore taken, and that compensation should be paid.
'It is worth comparing the above cases with those dealing
-with swamps or fresh water marshland. It has recently been
:held that high land is "presumably of greater value per acre
-,than marshland," and that swamp lands until recently were
,generally considered of insufficient value to warrant the
expense of survey.
330
IX. CONCLUSION
The decisions of the courts through the years have in-
terpreted both the uses of the public protected by the state
and the rights of private owners. The right of the state
to phosphates was deemed in the Pinckney case to include
ungranted marshlands, although not marshlands which had
335. 228 S. C. 382, 90 S. E. 2d 472 (1955), note 291, supra.
336. Nash v. Gardner, 232 S. C. 215, 101 S. E. 2d 283 (1957). Compare
Forshur Timber Co. v. Santee River Cypress Lumber Co., 203 S. C. 225,
178 S. E. 329 (1935) ; Ex parte Keller, 189 S. C. 26, 199 S. E. 909 (1938) ;
Santee River Cypress Lumber Co. v. Elliott, 153 S. C. 179, 150 S. E.
683 (1929) ; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 111 S. C. 87, 96 S. E. 714 (1918).
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been granted, as in the Oak Point Mines case, and as in
Chisolm v. Caines. At common law, the rules of construction
applied to marshland grants were not as strict as those applied
by the South Carolina courts.
Aside from the introduction in the Pinckney case of the
strict boundary rule that lands bounding on tidal, navigable
streams carry title only to the mean high water mark, most of
the controversy swirls about the Cape Romaine dictum and
the subsequent citation thereof by the Rice Hope case.
The present doubts upon marshland titles have arisen de-
spite: (1) a general usage and custom in all the coastal coun-
ties to convey high and marsh lands together, plat them
together, and use them together; (2) the rules of construc-
tion that grants are presumed valid, and that the Governor,
land officers and surveyors in the government of the province
and state did their duty and solemnly used the great seal, and
validly granted the lands in the state, including marshlands,
to the people for their use; (3) the common law rules of con-
struction permitting evidence of usage, boundaries, and any
other facts tending to show what was granted.
The majority of the Court in Cape Romaine apparently
viewed the rule as to the public trust as an incomplete rule,
and by ill-considered dicta extended its application from low
water mark as set in the Pacific Guano case, to high water
mark, without any authority for doing so in South Carolina.
This was done without going into the rules of construction
that should have been applied, and without looking to see
whether the boundary rule as applied was incomplete or capa-
ble of modification by evidence of usage or otherwise.
The controversy has arisen because there is no way to
reconcile the plain fact that marshlands in South Carolina
were regarded as vacant lands, were granted and were and
are used by the grantees and their successors and the rules
which the majority gratuitously set out in the Cape Romaine
case.
The present situation as to marshland titles claimed by
private parties is not that lawyers cannot pass titles to
them, but that they have no guide to show when to pass
such titles due to the doubt thrown by the Cape Romaine
and Rice Hope cases upon grants to all lands below high
1962]
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water mark not only in (within) but on (upon and adjacent
to) navigable streams flowed by the tide. At present, titles
to marshlands are simply thrown in to mortgages for what-
ever they may be worth, most of the value being given to
the high lands.
The courts have encountered some difficulty in defining
some of the terms and deciding the limits of some of the
rules which come into play in marshland cases. This has made
for confusion. In the Pinckney case, the decision on petition
for rehearing refers to high water mark as "that line (what-
ever it may be) ".3"
In the Pacific Guano case, the Court says that limiting the
riparian owner to high water mark accords with the view
that beds of tidal channels below mean low water mark are
held by the state in trust under jus publicum, which would
leave the area between high and low water marks as not sub-
ject to the trust,338 while the Cape Romaine case by dicta
extended the trust to include marshlands between high and
low water marks.339
In the Rice Hope case, in rejecting the contention that the
state has not such a servitude as the United States has in the
bed of a navigable stream, the court repeated the Cape Ro-
maine dictum that lands between high and low water mark
are held in trust by the state;340 whereas beds of tidal navi-
gable streams were clearly and properly defined in the Pa-
cific Guano case as "the bottom proper" or "the soil lying
below low water mark"341 so that the trust referred to should
not and does not extend to lands between low and high water
marks. The Cape Romaine dictum was a fundamental de-
parture from the Pacific Guano case.
Again, the rule that beds of navigable streams below mean
low water mark are held in trust by the state for navigation
and for fishery, stated plainly and accurately in Pacific
Guano and Oak Point Mines, was extended by the dictum
in the Cape Romaine case, repeated in Rice Hope, to include
all lands below high water mark, without any citation of
337. 22 S. C. 484, 510-511 (1884).
338. 22 S. C. 50, 83-84 (1884). See also Oak Point Mines, 22 S. C. 593,
601 (1884).
339. 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E. 434 (1928).
340. 216 S. 0. 500. 529-530. 59 S. E. 2d 132, 143-144 (1950).
341. 22 S. C. 50, 81 (1884).
[Vol. 14
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss3/1
TITLES TO MARSHLANDS
new authority for the change. This has been done by placing
absolute emphasis upon the boundary rule while ignoring
rules of construction of grants and common law rules pre-
suming validity in solemn grants of lands under the great seal
of the state. The common law did not lay down a blanket rule
that every boundary upon every tidal navigable stream carried
title only to high water mark, but permitted language and
usage to show what title was granted and what usage had
been made of the property. To assert that the common law
in South Carolina did not permit either grants of land butting
upon tidal, navigable streams to mean low water or a showing
of usage of such lands when granted is to try to re-write
much of the history of coastal South Carolina.
To extend the definition of navigability to include what
is plainly not navigable; to change the trust rule from beds
of navigable streams to all soil covered at high water; to
assert that non-navigable streams and marshlands are "beds"
of navigable streams, and that no grants carried same below
high water mark unless the magic words "to low water mark"
be contained in such grant, is to create ex post facto distinc-
tions far beyond what is necessary to protect the interests
of the public, and to strain to the breaking point the concepts
and legal principles governing grants of land and navigability
of streams. What is more to do so is unnecessary to protect
the public rights.
As pointed out above,3 42 there is no reason why title to the
soil under navigable streams must be in the state. The state
may reserve its rights to phosphates, control of navigation
and fishery, roads and bridges, development of ports, etc.,
and remove itself from the field of title and ownership of
the soil where not necessary to protect the public interest.
The Congress of the United States has deemed it sufficient
to protect the interests of the national public, that easements
for navigation, national defense and commerce be reserved
and by passing the Submerged Lands Act has removed many
questions from marshlands titles which formerly existed by
reason of the rulings of the U. S. Supreme Court in the so-
called Tidelands Oil Cases.
Although the dictum of Cape Romaine was quoted in the
Rice Hope case, the following statement from the latter case
342. See note 201, supra.
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is in line with the action of the Federal Government in re-
moving itself from the field of titles to tidelands except for
certain specific servitudes and reservations, and shows a rec-
ognition of the servitude concept as opposed to the title con-
cept:
. . . we do not deem it necessary or proper upon this
appeal to determine under what circumstances or by
what method, if any, title might be acquired by private
owners, because any such ownership would be, in our
opinion, subject to the dominant power of the govern-
ment (State and Federal) to control and regulate navi-
gable waters.34
3
In view of the blanket nature of the ruling in the Rice Hope
case, and the claim of ownershin in both the plaintiff land-
owner and the authority, it is debatable whether it was not
necessary either to go to the methods by which private owner-
ship of marshlands or rice lands might be acquired, or else to
lay some reassurance to private ownership whose titles were
possibly involved under the blanket ruling. The public under
those dicta was the beneficiary of a trust suddenly broad-
ened from lands below low water mark to lands below high
water mark. As to private ownership of marshlands and rice-
lands, it would appear to have been proper not only that
the Court decide how title might be acquired by private per-
sons but also how any unnecessary clouds on title might be
removed.
It was not necessary to decide in the Cape Romaine case
that titles to all marshlands be unsettled by declaring all
marshlands to be soil under navigable streams and thereby
impressed with a newly discovered trust for the public. Nor
was it necessary to decide the Rice Hope case in such man-
ner as to unsettle the titles to all ricelands subject to tidal
flow by repeating the Cape Romaine dictum. Certainly it
seems unfair that one owning marshlands or lowlands abut-
ting fresh waters should have preferential treatment over his
low-country neighbor whose lowlands happen to abut upon
tidal streams, all because of distinctions at common law
which our Court has heretofore regarded as artificial. The
present concept of navigability, free-loating, unfettered
and without authority of any decision prior to Cape Romaine,
should be bound down to a definite limit by clear definiton.
343. 216 S. C. 500, 530, 59 S. E. 2d 132, 145 (1950).
[Vol. 14
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss3/1
1962] TITLES TO MARSHLANDS
. It is also utterly inconsistent to maintain and assert the
right of the state or previous sovereign to grant tide lands
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 3 4" and then turni
around in the twentieth and declare that the grantee of those
solemn grants did not receive anything but a scrap of paper
because the lands granted are tidelands.
Several suggestions have been made which may prove
helpful, including a board to be created by the legislature
to examine claims to marshlands, 345 an act permitting the
state to be sued, or an act authorizing the Budget and Control
Board to sell the state's interest under certain conditions.
3 40
No right has been more consistently demanded, maintained
and exalted in English and American law than the freedom
to own land under rules which are not changed from time
to time to suit the whims of the sovereign, whether King
or state. Marshlands are real estate submerged by salt water
twice a day, and the rules relating thereto should not be
changed in the twentieth century in such a manner as to throw
doubt upon what was legally done or decided in the eighteenth
344. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
345. "There is no board or agency set up by the Legislature to examine
into the justness of such claims (of marshland titles) that we know of.
This question of the rights of the State in its marshlands and the right
to convey or confirm the title to them is of great importance to the State
and should be settled. Apparently, the Supreme Court should pass on
these matters ... "
"We realize that legislative findings of fact are generally binding and
that all acts passed by the Legislature are presumed to be constitutional.
Due to the great demand for marshland and the vast increase in value
in the last few years, the law should be made crystal clear . . . " Opinion
Atty. General, March 27, 1959, in 1959 House Journal pages 731-732.
346. "While the Legislature has the right to confirm title to real
property, this apparently means only that the Legislature may make firm
an already existing claim or grant. It cannot sell or give away the prop-
erty of the State without just compensation to the State. Furthermore,
the Legislature cannot adjudicate claims respecting title to property as this
is a judicial function. 16 0. J. S. Constitutional Law § 118 (1956).
"One possible reason why this marshland question has not been settled
is the fact that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Lowry v.
Thompson, 25 S. C. 416 (1886). It would appear proper for the Legis-
lature to consent to suits against the State to settle these marshland
questions, but that is a matter for the Legislature.
"It is our opinion that the Legislature could lawfully pass an act giving
the Budget and Control Board, or other body, the right to sell the marshes
belonging to the State for fair value, after due advertising, with a pro-
vision for hearing any objections by adjoining landowners, the Army
Engineers, or any resources agency. This is done in other southern states
and protects the right of owners of beach cottages and such property.
Of course, the Cape Romaine case may prevent this but we believe that
a proper judicial interpretation of that case would clarify the matter
and permit such sales."
Opinion Atty. General, April 10, 1959, quoted in 1959 House Journal,
860 at 861-862, with veto message from Governor.
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and nineteenth centuries. Certainty of property law is a ne-
cessity, and the rules relating to property and private owner-
ship of marshlands should be certain and clear.
It is one thing to require that soil under navigable waters
be held subject to the public use. It is quite another to extend
the trust, as a matter of law, to marshlands, and thereby to
deny the right of ownership to persons having possession and
claiming under solemn grants carrying the great seal of the
state as public testimony of their validity.
Free men have grown accustomed to respect the past acts
of their governments. It is not any helpful contribution to
that respect, to subsequently interpret these grants as grant-
ing absolutely nothing by way of title, simply because the soil
of the lands granted happens to be marsh lands.
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